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Preface
In April 2004, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was commissioned byNASA’s Chief 
Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Officer to review and render a technical opinion on the
probability of a catastrophic failure related to this scenario: The Space Shuttle Program (SSP) recognized
a zero-fault-tolerant design related to an inadvertent firing of the primary reaction control system (RCS)
jets on the Orbiter during mated operations with the International Space Station (ISS). It was determined
that an un-commanded firing of an RCS jet could cause serious damage or loss of both the SSP Orbiter
and the ISS. Several scenarios were suggested in which an un-commanded firing of the RCS jet is
possible [1]. These scenarios include an arc track event in the 28-volt heater circuits that could result in a
wire-to-wire short to the adjacent reaction control jet wire. In this worst-case scenario, enough current
and power could be applied to activate the reaction control jet valves and fire a thruster. The following
report summarizes the work that was sponsored by the NESC as part of their assessment of the Orbiter
inadvertent firing of a RCS thruster while attached to the ISS [2].
Introduction
Background
During the life cycle of an aircraft or spacecraft, new information and performance data change (and even
invalidate) engineering assumptions that were made during the initial design and development of a
platform. This information can affect many aspects of ownership including the validity of any previous
safety analyses. In some cases, a new failure mode may be postulated, found to be a significant threat, and
appropriate mitigation techniques developed and deployed to reduce the newly discovered threat to an
acceptable level. Where necessary, laboratory evaluation may be needed to acquire data to evaluate new
risks, solutions, and advance a technical way forward. The development of mitigation techniques to
prevent un-commanded firing of the Space Shutle’s primary RCS jets is an example of such a process.
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20060009469 2019-08-29T21:26:13+00:00Z
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This report presents the results of arc track testing conducted to determine if such a transfer of power to
un-energized wires is possible and/or likely during an arcing event, and to evaluate an array of protection
schemes that may significantly reduce the possibility of such a transfer. The results of these experiments
may be useful for determining the level of protection necessary to guard against spurious voltage and
current being applied to safety critical circuits.
It was not the purpose of these experiments to determine the probability of the initiation of an arc track
event ― only if an initiation did occur could it cause the undesired event: an inadvertent thruster firing.
The primary wire insulation used in the Orbiter is aromatic polyimide, or Kapton®, a construction known
to arc track under certain conditions [3]. Previous Boeing testing has shown that arc tracks can initiate in
aromatic polyimide insulated 28 volts direct current (VDC) power circuits using more realistic techniques
such as chafing with an aluminum blade (simulating the corner of an avionics box or lip of a wire tray), or
vibration of an aluminum plate against a wire bundle [4]. Therefore, an arc initiation technique was
chosen that provided a reliable and consistent technique of starting the arc and not a realistic simulation of
a scenario on the vehicle. Once an arc is initiated, the current, power and propagation characteristics of
the arc depend on the power source, wire gauge and insulation type, circuit protection and series
resistance rather than type of initiation. The initiation method employed for these tests was applying an
oil and graphite mixture to the ends of a powered twisted pair wire.
The flight configuration of the heater circuits, the fuel/oxider (or ox) wire, and the RCS jet solenoid were
modeled in the test configuration so that the behavior of these components during an arcing event could
be studied. To determine if coil activation would occur with various protection wire schemes, 145 tests
were conducted using various fuel/ox wire alternatives (shielded and unshielded) and/or different
combinations of polytetrafuloroethylene (PTFE), Mystik® tape and convoluted wraps to prevent
unwanted coil activation.
Test results were evaluated along with other pertinent data and information to develop a mitigation
strategy for an inadvertent RCS firing. The SSP evaluated civilian aircraft wiring failures to search for
aging trends in assessing the wire-short hazard. Appendix 2 applies Weibull statistical methods to the
same data with a similar purpose.
Experimental Detail
Test Specimen Configuration and Experimental Setup
Twenty-nine different configurations were tested, with five tests per configuration for a total of 145 tests.
All test configurations consisted of heater wires and a set of fuel/ox wires. Heater circuits were made of
twisted pairs and fuel/ox wires were either two twisted pairs, one twisted quad, or two shielded twisted
pairs, as shown in Figure 1. In all tests, the heater circuits and fuel/ox bundles were bundled together and
an arc was initiated in the heater wire bundle. The arc was allowed to propagate down the length of the
bundle and damage to the fuel/ox bundle was assessed.
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Figure 1. Fuel/Ox Wire Options
Within the set of 145 tests, there were subtle differences in the bundle configurations depending on the
number of heater circuits, the type of fuel/ox wire, and the materials used to assemble and protect the
bundle. These configurations were grouped into four distinct types, displayed in Figure 2. The application
of the protection scheme changed both the size and weight for the fuel/ox bundles. Each protection
scheme had a unique impact on the size and weight of the wire bundle. The range of possible
configurations is shown in Figure 3.
The type of fuel/ox wire, protection schemes, and circuit protection for each group of five tests are
summarized in Table 1. Each protection scheme was applied according to Boeing Orbiter wire harness
assembly and installation specifications ML0303-0013D and ML0303-0014N. A description of the
twelve different protection schemes evaluated is provided in Appendix 1.
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Figure 2. Cross-section of Protection Schemes and Heater Wire Circuits
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Figure 3. Composite Photo of Various Protection Configurations
Table 1. Test Configurations Evaluated
1st Layer
(Bottom)
2nd Layer
(Top)
N264 1-5 1 1 Twist Quad NA NA 15 A
N264 6-10 1 3 Twist Quad NA NA 15 A
N264 11-15 2 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair NA NA 15 A
N264 16-20 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap None 15 A
N264 21-25 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik None 15 A
N264 26-30 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute None 15 A
N264 31-35 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap PTFE Wrap 15 A
N264 36-40 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap Mystik 15 A
N264 41-45 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap Convolute 15 A
N264 46-50 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik PTFE Wrap 15 A
N264 51-55 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik Mystik 15 A
N264 56-60 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik Convolute 15 A
N264 61-65 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute PTFE Wrap 15 A
N264 66-70 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute Mystik 15 A
N264 71-75 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute Convolute 15 A
N264 76-80 4 3 2 Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap None 15 A
N264 81-85 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Mystik None 15 A
N264 86-90 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Convolute None 15 A
N264 91-95 4 3 2 Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap PTFE Wrap 15 A
N264 96-100 4 3 2 Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap Mystik 15 A
N264 101-105 4 3 2 Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap Convolute 15 A
N264 106-110 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Mystik PTFE Wrap 15 A
N264 111-115 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Mystik Mystik 15 A
N264 116-120 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Mystik Convolute 15 A
N264 121-125 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Convolute PTFE Wrap 15 A
N264 126-130 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Convolute Mystik 15 A
N264 131-135 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Convolute Convolute 15 A
N264 136-140 1 1 Twist Quad NA NA 10 A
N264 141-145 1 3 Twist Quad NA NA 10 A
Protection Schemes Circuit
Protection
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Each of the four harness configurations, displayed in Figures 4a through 4d, required a slightly different
experimental setup. Differential voltage probes and current shunts are included at appropriate locations in
the circuits to capture useful information during the arcing event (Figures 4a through 4d). Data were
collected on a Nicolet Vision Datalogger at 1 kilosample (KS)/sec.
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Figure 4a. Harness Configuration 1: 1 Heater Circuit, Fuel/Ox = Unshielded Twisted Quad
Harness configuration 1 (Figure 4a) was the simplest configuration, with only one heater circuit. This
configuration was used in Tests 1 through 5 with unprotected twisted quad for the fuel/ox wires. This
setup corresponds to the configuration that exists in some locations on the Orbiter.
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Figure 4b. Harness Configuration 1: 3 Heater Circuits, Fuel/Ox = Unshielded Twisted Quad
Harness configuration 1 with three heater circuits (Figure 4b) was used in Tests 5 through 10 for the
unprotected twisted quad. This series of tests represents the configuration that presently exists in some
locations on the Orbiter. Tests performed in this group determined whether the present Orbiter
configuration would allow enough voltage and current to be transferred to the fuel/ox wires to cause coil
activation.
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Figure 4c. Harness Configurations 2 and 3: 3 Heater Circuits, Fuel/Ox = Shielded Twisted Pair
Harness configurations 2 and 3, with three heater circuits (Figure 4c), were used in Tests 11 through 75.
This series of tests used two twisted shielded pairs for the fuel/ox wires, and included five tests for each
of the protection schemes identified in Table 2. Note that the purple box highlights the fuel/ox wires. It
should be recognized that each twisted shielded pair had its own metal shield and that one shield does not
protect both twisted pairs of fuel/ox wire (see Figures 1 and 2).
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Figure 4d. Harness Configuration 4: 3 Heater Circuits, Fuel/Ox = 2 Unshielded Twisted Pairs
Harness configuration 4 (Figure 4d) was used in Tests 76 through 145. This configuration was essentially
the same as configurations 2 and 3, with unshielded twisted pairs replacing the shielded twisted pairs for
the fuel/ox wires. This test series included five specimens for each of the protection schemes identified in
Table 1.
Heater circuits were represented in the test configurations, but the actual heaters were not. On the Orbiter,
the heater switching is located in the fuel/ox valve assembly. Therefore, even when the heaters are off, the
heater wires are energized up to the switch at the valve. In this series of tests the heaters were simulated in
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the “off” position (open circuit). If the heaters had been included in the test circuit the heaters would have 
been in parallel with the arc. There would have been little effect on the arc except that the additional
heater current would cause the circuit protection to trip earlier limiting the damage.
The 25 feet of 20 American Wire Gage (AWG) (Figures 4a through 4d) wire was used to simulate an
event that may occur away from the power bus ― this represents the configuration on the Orbiter. The
resistance of the 25 feet of wire (~0.25 ohms in both the feeder and return) limits the power in the arc, but
also slows the speed that the arc travels and increases the time before the circuit protection (fuse) opens.
The later two of these factors tend to increase the collateral damage caused by the arc. While the
additional resistance of the 25 feet of wire tends to stabilize the arc, too much resistance (wire) inhibits
the arc.
Research into fuel/ox circuits indicated that the aft thrusters are protected, such that “a steady state load 
current of 15 amperes (amp) shal cause the fusible link to open” (Rockwel Procurement Specification 
MC477-0263, paragraph 3.4.5). Therefore, the 15 amp fuse was conservative since at this value, the
current would not cause the fuse to open. However, without more detailed information, the more
conservative protection was used. The forward reaction jet driver (RJD) uses smaller fuses. Therefore,
additional tests using harness configuration 1 specimens were performed using 10 amp fuses as protection
for the heater circuits.
Test Procedure
After all preliminary checks were performed, the heater circuits were energized and the oil/graphite
mixture was used to initiate the arc. The arc was allowed to propagate the length of the sample. The arc
event tripped the circuit protection, self–extinguished the arc, or stopped when it reached the end of the
sample. After the power was turned off, the specimen was removed from the testing chamber and all test
information was recorded. A visual inspection of the sample gave preliminary indications of the
effectiveness of the protection scheme. For each sample, wet dielectric voltage withstand (DVW) test was
used to determine if the insulation of the fuel/ox wires was actually compromised. Figure 5 is a still shot
(captured from video) of Test N264-008 in progress.
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Figure 5. Test N264-008 In Progress
The opening of the fuel/ox valve was detected in three ways:
1. Audible clicking sound of valve solenoids.
2. Accelerometer measurements.
3. Coil voltage and current measurements indicating that the coil was at or above the operational
threshold.
Damage to the specimen and fuel/ox wire was determined in the following ways:
1. Coil voltage and current measurements (including shield current measurements).
2. Fuel/ox wire damage (visual and wet DVW test).
3. Breach of protection layers (visual examination).
Results
Table 2 summarizes test results with identical harness configuration, protection scheme, and circuit
protection grouped together.
Page 10 of 28
9th Joint FAA/DoD/NASA 2006 Aging Aircraft Conference
March 6-9, 2006
Table 2. Test Results Summary Grouped by Experimental Conditions
The background color of the rows signifies the possibility of an arc track event causing the fuel/ox valve
to open or caused damage to the fuel/ox wire according to the following:
• Red: It is likely that the fuel/ox valve would open due to an arc track event. This would
not be an unexpected event should an arc track occur.
• Yellow: It is unlikely that the fuel/ox valve would open due to an arc track event;
however, significant damage to the fuel/ox wires could be expected.
• Green: It is very unlikely that the fuel/ox valve would open due to an arc track event. It is
also unlikely that significant damage to the fuel/ox wires could be expected.
The results columns provide the following information:
Audible Click, Valve Opened: When the fuel/ox valve opened and closed, a clicking sound could easily
be heard. This column records the number of tests in each group of 5 in which the valve opening/closing
was heard.
Accelerometer Activity: The accelerometers, placed on the valve solenoids, were used to “listen” for 
valve movement. The accelerometer records if movement was detected for any test in the group of 5.
1st Layer
(Bottom)
2nd Layer
(Top)
N264 1-5 1 1 Twist Quad NA NA 15 A 5/5 Yes 24 V / 2.1 A Yes NA
N264 6-10 1 3 Twist Quad NA NA 15 A 4/5 Yes 23 V / 2.0 A Yes NA
N264 136-140 1 1 Twist Quad NA NA 10 A 2/5 Yes 24.8 V / 2.1 A Yes NA
N264 141-145 1 3 Twist Quad NA NA 10 A 0/5 No 3.5 V/ 0.1 A Yes NA
N264 11-15 2 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair NA NA 15 A 0/5 No 2.2 V / 0.2 A Yes NA
N264 16-20 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap None 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V Slight 4/5
N264 21-25 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik None 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V Slight* 2/5*
N264 26-30 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute None 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 2/5
N264 31-35 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap PTFE Wrap 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 0/5
N264 36-40 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap Mystik 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 0/5
N264 41-45 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap Convolute 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 0/5
N264 46-50 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik PTFE Wrap 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 1/5
N264 51-55 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik Mystik 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 0/5
N264 56-60 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Mystik Convolute 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 0/5
N264 61-65 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute PTFE Wrap 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 0/5
N264 66-70 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute Mystik 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 0/5
N264 71-75 3 3 2 Sh/Tw/Pair Convolute Convolute 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 0/5
N264 76-80 4 3 2 Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap None 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V Yes 4/5
N264 81-85 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Mystik None 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V Slight 3/5
N264 86-90 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Convolute None 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 1/5
N264 91-95 4 3 2 Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap PTFE Wrap 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 0/5
N264 96-100 4 3 2 Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap Mystik 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 1/5
N264 101-105 4 3 2 Tw/Pair PTFE Wrap Convolute 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 0/5
N264 106-110 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Mystik PTFE Wrap 15 A 0/5** No** < 1 V** No 0/5
N264 111-115 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Mystik Mystik 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 0/5
N264 116-120 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Mystik Convolute 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 0/5
N264 121-125 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Convolute PTFE Wrap 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 0/5
N264 126-130 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Convolute Mystik 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 0/5
N264 131-135 4 3 2 Tw/Pair Convolute Convolute 15 A 0/5 No < 1 V No 0/5
Max Coil
Volt/Current
Reading
Circuit
Protection
(fuse rating)
* Specimen N264 – 021 had only 1 wrap of Mystik Tape instead of 3 caled for in ML 0303-0014. This shield for this specimen failed the 
DVW where the shield for the other 4 specimen in this configuration did not.
** Specimen N264 – 106: movement of sample during arc caused Fuel/Ox valve clip lead to touch the heater terminal block and the 
valve opened. However this was not due to arcing damage or power transferred by the arc. Note: The protection layers were not fully
breached.
Damage to
Fuel/Ox
Wires
Breach of All
Protection
Layers
Harness
Config #
Test #
# Heater
Circuits
Fuel/Ox Wire
Accelero-
meter Activity
Audible Click,
Valve
Opened
Protection Schemes
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Max Coil Volt/Current Reading: The column shows if there was any electrical activity in the fuel/ox
wire even though it was not to an amplitude that opened the valve. If the valve did open at ambient
pressure during the test, the current required to open the valve under flight pressure would be higher.
These values were used to show that the valve would or would not have opened if it were pressurized.
Note: Momentary spikes in voltage and current were not used to determine maximum values.
Damage to Fuel/Ox Wires: Damage indications were the wet DVW test and visual examination. The
characterization“Slight” only indicates superficial damage to the insulation.
Breach of All Protection Layers: Determined visually in post-test, this can be used to judge the merit of
a given protection scheme.
The considerations that led to the placement of the groups in the red, yellow or green categories follow
along with examples of typical test data.
Red: Likely that the fuel/ox valve would open due to an arc track event
The Configuration 1 groups, with unprotected twisted quad fuel/ox wire, were the only ones placed in this
category. Eleven (11) of the 20 tests resulted in the fuel/ox valve opening. Table 3 shows data for the
individual tests. Both 1 and 3 heater circuit tests caused the valve to open. From this data, it is evident that
the 15 amp fuses allowed the whole specimen to be damaged without opening while the 10-amp fuse
limited the arc damage by opening before much damage could occur. In general, the 10-amp fuse would
open as soon as the arc entered the main bundle and reached a spot-tie. However, even with the 10 amp
fuse limiting damage, it was still possible to have the fuel/ox valve open for durations up to one second
due to the arc. While the 3 heater circuit 10 amp fuse group did not cause the fuel/ox valve to open in any
of the five tests, it was still placed in this category because of the damage caused to the fuel/ox wire.
Also in Test 144, there was arcing directly to one of the coil return wires.
Note: Classical statistical analyses were performed on Tables 3 through 6. It was determined
that they do support the trends shown in the tables.
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Table 3. Tests Results of the Unprotected Specimens
*The signals oscillated around zero and were most likely from electrical noise generated by the arcing
event.
Figure 7 shows the coil voltage and current traces along with the accelerometer reading for Test 008 in
which the fuel/ox valve opened. Just before the 26 second mark, ~5 volts (blue line) was measured across
the coil with an associated current, < 0.5 amps (red line), measured through the coil. This indicates that
the insulation of the fuel/ox wire feeding the high side of the coil was compromised and there was arcing
directly to the conductor of that wire. This arcing current returned to ground through the coil with the
resistance of the coil (~11.5 ohms) limiting the current. At this voltage/current level the coil was not
activated, and the valve remained closed. After ~0.5 seconds the arcing produced a higher voltage across
the coil (~12 volts) and the coil activated. The valve opened as recorded by the accelerometers (violet
line). Note that the second accelerometer also recorded the opening, but since the traces overlap, it cannot
be seen. The voltage across the coil rose to over 15 volts and then collapsed as the fuel/ox return wires
also became directly involved in the arc. It was impossible to maintain a voltage across the coil (see
discussion of Figure 8 in the next paragraph). The accelerometers also recorded the closing of the valve at
about 28 seconds.
V Amp
N264 - 001 15 A 1 Y 6 N 24 2.1 4.6
N264 - 002 15 A 1 Y 6 N 18 1.4 1
N264 - 003 15 A 1 Y 7 N 20 0.8 < .05
N264 - 004 15 A 1 Y 6 N 14 1.1 0.8
N264 - 005 15 A 1 Y 8 N 15 1.3 0.9
N264 - 006 15 A 3 Y 8 N N N 22 1.9 2.2
N264 - 007 15 A 3 Y 8 N N N 10 0.8 0.3
N264 - 008 15 A 3 Y 9 N N N 15 1.4 2
N264 - 009 15 A 3 Y 8 N N N 21 1.8 0.7
N264 - 010 15 A 3 N 8 N N N 5 0.4 NA
N264 - 136 10 A 1 Y 4 N 24 2.0 0.25
N264 - 137 10 A 1 Y 2 Y 24 2.1 1
N264 - 138 10 A 1 N 2 Y 0 0.0 NA
N264 - 139 10 A 1 N 2 Y 15* 0.2* NA
N264 - 140 10 A 1 N 1 Y 0 0.0 NA
N264 - 141 10 A 3 N 1 Y N N 0 0.0 NA
N264 - 142 10 A 3 N 1 Y N N 0 0.0 NA
N264 - 143 10 A 3 N 1 Y N Y 0 0.0 NA
N264 - 144 10 A 3 N 2 Y N N 3.5* 0.1* NA
N264 - 145 10 A 3 N 1 Y Y Y 0 0.0 NA
H#2 H#3
Duration
Valve
Opened
(sec)
Fuse
Rating
Test #
Typical Energized
Coil Voltage &
Current
# of
Heater
Circuits
Valve
Opened?
(Audible
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(inchs).
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H#1
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Figure 7. Coil Current and Voltage Traces along with Accelerometer Measurements for Test 008
Figure 8 shows the current (upper traces) and voltage (lower trace) of the arcing wires for Test 8. The
darker blue line in the upper trace is the feeder current for the wire in which the arc was initiated (heater
#1). The lighter blue line is the return current for heater #1, which by convention is negative. The dark
blue line in the lower trace is the voltage at the point when the specimen is attached at the end of the
feeder.
Figure 8 also shows the current for the first few seconds of the arc varied greatly, but that it averaged
around 15 amps. At this time, the arc voltage (the difference between the dark and light blue lines in the
lower traces) was ~ 20 volts. At ~19 seconds, the arc current rose to 40+ amps for 0.6 seconds as the arc
propagated through the first spot-tie. Note that the arc voltage was reduced to less than 10 volts as the
increased current caused a higher voltage drop in the feeders. This shows the regulatory effect of the
feeder resistance because, as the arc current increases, the arc voltage is reduced. The 15 amp fuse did not
open at this point because the duration of the current peak was not long enough for this to occur. At the
20-second mark, the return for heater #2 (gold line) became involved in the arc. At this point in time, the
heater #1 wire arced to both the heater #1 and heater #2 returns. At about the 22.5 second mark, the heater
#3 wire became involved in the arc followed a short time later by the red return. At ~24 seconds, the
heater #2 wire also became involved in the event. At this time, the fuel/ox wires had not become involved
in the event, but as shown in Figure 7, this changed at ~26 seconds. The activation of the coil can be seen
in Figure 8 by observing the slight drip in the fuel/ox return current (green line) as the coil current is
returning via the wire. The return current jumps to more than –20 amps, at just over 27 seconds, since
there is arcing directly to the fuel/ox return. This causes the coil voltage to collapse and the valve to close.
Page 14 of 28
9th Joint FAA/DoD/NASA 2006 Aging Aircraft Conference
March 6-9, 2006
Figure 8. Current and Voltages in the Arcing Event in Test Specimen 008
Figure 9 is the post-test photo of Test Specimen 008 which used 15-amp fuses. The figure shows the
extensive damage to both the fuel/ox wire and the heater wire. A section of several of the heater wires
have been destroyed (evaporated) in the arc.
Figure 10 shows the post-test photo from Test Specimen 136 which used 10-amp fuses. There is much
less damage than in Figure 9, as the 10-amp fuse protected the test specimen. However, there still is
significant damage to the fuel/ox wires.
Figure 9. Post-test Photo of Test Specimen 008 (15 amp fuse)
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Figure 10. Post-test Photo of Test Specimen 136 (10 amp fuse)
Figure 11 shows a photomicrograph of the damage to the fuel/ox wire of Test Specimen 004. The
insulation of the upper wire has been destroyed in the arc and the conductor is exposed. This wire was
connected to the high side of the coil. The lower return wires are also damaged and exhibit exposed
conductors.
Figure 11. Photomicrograph of Damage to Fuel/Ox Wires
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Yellow: Unlikely that the fuel/ox valve would open due to an arc track event
Two groups (011-015 and 76-80) were placed in this category. The fuel/ox wires of the former were
unprotected, shielded twisted pairs and the latter were twisted pairs (non-shielded) protected with one
wrap of PTFE tape. Figure 12 shows the voltage and current across the coil for Test 012. There is no
activity except oscillations of a few volts after the 22-second mark. These oscillations were most likely
from electrical noise generated by the arcing event. The fuel/ox wire from Test 012 passed the wet DVW
test indicating that there could not have been direct current going from the arc to the fuel/ox wire. Thus,
there was only a capacitive/inductive coupled current. The sampling rate of the data logger was too low
to obtain frequency information for the oscillations. There is no movement of the valve detected by the
accelerometers.
Figure 12. Voltage and Current across the Coil and Accelerometer Measurements for Test
Specimen 012
Figure 13 shows the post-test photo of Test Specimen 012. There has been damage to the fuel/ox wires
and the shield has been exposed in several places. Because of the heat generated by arcing to the shield, it
remains possible that the fuel/ox wire inside the shield may be heat damaged. However, as long as the
shield is intact, it is impossible for voltage and current to be transferred from the arc to the inner wires.
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Figure 13. Post-test Photos of Test Specimen 012
Figure 14a shows an example of a breach in the shield. Figure 14b shows damage to an inner fuel/ox wire
at the point that it failed the wet DVW test. There is not an obvious breach exposing the conductor, but
the insulation had been damage such that it could not prevent current conduction.
Figure 14a. Close-up of Damaged Shield 14b. Photomicrograph of the Fuel/Ox Wire at the
(Test Specimen 011) spot that it failed the wet DWV
(Test Specimen 011)
Figure 15 is a photomicrograph of Test Specimen 076. This was the worst-case damage to the fuel/ox
wire of any of the protected specimens. Despite the damage, this wire passed the post-test wet DVW as
there was still sufficient wire insulation remaining. There was no voltage or current measured across the
coil of this specimen and no valve movement detected by the accelerometers.
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Figure 15. Post-test Photomicrograph of Fuel/Ox Wire Test Specimen 076
Green: Very unlikely that the fuel/ox valve would open due to an arc track event
The data review for all tests in the green category indicated no voltage or measurable current across the
coil. There was no valve movement detected by the accelerometers in any of these tests.
Visual examination of these specimens showed that in many cases the protection did not breach through
the protective layers and the fuel/ox wires were in “like new” condition. In some cases, the protection was
breached and slight damage occurred to the fuel/ox wire such as spot charring of the topcoat.
Comparison of Effectiveness of Different Protection Materials
A goal of the project was to compare the effectiveness of the different protection materials in preventing
arcing damage. For protection of the fuel/ox wires, 120 tests were performed with permutations of PTFE
wrap, Mystik® tape wrap, and PTFE convoluted tubing (see Table 2). From these 120 tests, 40 test
samples were constructed with each of the protection materials as the top layer of protection. In 10 of the
40 test specimens it was the only layer of protection; in the other 30 test specimens, it was the top layer of
a multilayer protection. Test specimens were visually examined after the tests to determine if the top layer
of protection was breached completely. Table 4 shows the number of times each material was breached.
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Table 4. Top Layer Breaches
Top Layer Material
Number
of
Breaches
Percent
Breached
PTFE 31/40 78%
Mystik® Tape 23/40 58%
PTFE Convoluted 12/40 30%
Comparison of Effectiveness of Single and Double Layer Protection Schemes
Table 5, broken-down by single and double layer protection schemes, shows the number of times the
protection scheme was breached completely to the fuel/ox wire. As expected, the double layer protection
schemes were much more effective in protecting the fuel/ox wire.
Table 5. Comparison Between Single and Double Layer Protection
Description Single LayerProtection Schemes
Double Layer
Protection Schemes
Number of tests in which all layers protection
schemes were breached exposing fuel/ox wire 16 of 30 (53.3 %) 2 of 90 (2.2 %)
Comparison of RJD Arc Track Test with Previous Boeing Tests
Table 6 shows a comparison between the RJD tests and those performed previously for Boeing-
Huntington Beach [5, 6].
Table 6. Comparison of Results of Previous Tests Performed with those from Current Program
None 100% (6/6) 100% (10/10)
PTFE 78% (7/9) 80% (8/10) 44% (4/9) 0% (0/10)
Mystic 67% (2/3) 50% (5/10) 33% (1/3) 10% (1/10) (shield)
Teflon Convolute 100% (12/12) 30% (3/10) 42% (5/12) 0% (0/10)
PTFE/PTFE 50% (1/2) 0% (0/10) 0% (0/2) 0% (0/10)
Mystic/PTFE 0% (0/2) 10% (2/20) 0% (0/2) 0% (0/20)
Teflon Conv/Teflon Conv 14% (1/7) 0% (0/10) 0% (0/7) 0% (0/10)
Protection Scheme
NA NA
Wet DVW Failure
Previous Tests RJD TestsPrevious Tests
Breached All Layers
RJD Tests
Several differences observed in the two sets of tests included:
1. The previous tests had 11 or more power wires in the arcing bundle.
2. Typical average arcing currents in the previous Boeing tests were approximately 230 amps
compared to 50-60 amps in current RJD tests.
3. In the previous Boeing tests, there was no circuit protection except for 175 amp current limiters
on the battery banks.
4. In some cases with the previous Boeing tests, the protection was on the arcing bundle, and not on
the target bundle.
Page 20 of 28
9th Joint FAA/DoD/NASA 2006 Aging Aircraft Conference
March 6-9, 2006
5. In the previous Boeing tests, when two applications of protection were used, one application was
on the arcing bundle and one application was on the target bundle.
The results show that the higher current levels, and therefore high power in the earlier tests, caused more
damage than observed in the present tests. In fact, the higher level of current defeated the single layer
protection schemes and in many cases damaged the protected wires. The higher current tests did breach
the Teflon® convolute more consistently than the other protection, which is different than the present test
results. The double layer protection schemes did provide adequate protection even with the higher current
level of the earlier tests, although they could also be breached also. In general, the results of the earlier
tests correlate with the present tests when the increase of power of the earlier experiments is considered.
Conclusions
During the life cycle of an aircraft or spacecraft, new failure scenarios are discovered which must be
addressed in order to meet safety design requirements. An example is the discovery of a failure condition
that could lead to an inadvertent firing of a Space Shuttle RCS thruster when the Shuttle is attached to the
ISS. Analysis suggests an inadvertent thruster firing could be catastrophic to both vehicles. In the
Orbiter, the thruster valve control wiring is bundled with 28 VDC wiring which has sufficient voltage and
current to open a valve and cause the un-commanded thruster firing. This failure scenario only became a
safety concern well into the life cycle of the Shuttle. In response to this hazard, a systematic laboratory
approach for determining the effectiveness of selected wire protection schemes was developed. The
result was a process for electrically isolating Space Shuttle RCS control wiring from adjacent power
wiring in the presence of an arc track event. Test results show a single layer of Teflon convoluted tubing
or Mystik® tape and, to a lesser extent, PTFE tape is adequate to protect critical wires against moderate
current (50 to 60 amps) arcing faults. A double layer protection approach using the three above materials
provides the best isolation from adjacent arcing faults and is recommended for high current applications.
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Appendix 1. Listing of 12 Different Protection Schemes Tested
* These protection schemes are not includes in the ML 0303-0013 or ML 0303-0014 specifications.
Fabricated per Space Shuttle Program wiring spec ML0303-0013 and ML0303-0014 (Section 4.1.3 : ‘Protection’)
First (or bottom)
Layer
Second (or top) Layer
1 PTFE Wrap None 1 Wrap 10 mil PTFE tape: 25-75% Overlap (Section 4.1.3.2.3)
2 Mystik 7503 Tape None 3 Wraps 4 mil Mystik Tape: 50% Overlap (Section 4.1.3.2.4)
3 Teflon Convoluted
Tubing
None 1 application 5/8” convolute (Section 4.1.3.2.6)
4 PTFE Wrap PTFE Wrap 2 Wraps 10 mil PTFE tape (Section 4.1.3.4.3)
5* PTFE Wrap Mystik 7503 Tape 1 Wrap 10 mil PTFE (Section 4.1.3.2.3) then 3 Wraps 4 mil
Mystik (Section 4.1.3.2.4)
6 PTFE Wrap Teflon Convoluted Tubing 1 Wrap 10 mil PTFE then 1 application 5/8” convolute (Section
4.1.3.4.1)
7 Mystik 7503 Tape PTFE Wrap 3 Wraps 4 mil Mystik Tape: 50% Overlap then 1 Wrap 10 mil
PTFE tape: 25-75% Overlap (Section 4.1.3.4.4)
8 Mystik 7503 Tape Mystik 7503 Tape 6 Wraps 4 mil Mystik Tape: 50% Overlap (Section 4.1.3.4.5)
9 Mystik 7503 Tape Teflon Convoluted Tubing 3 Wraps 4 mil Mystic Tape: 50% Overlap then 1 application
5/8” convolute (Section 4.1.3.4.2)
10* Teflon Convoluted
Tubing
PTFE Wrap 1 application 5/8” convolute (4.1.3.2.6) then 1 Wrap 10 mil 
PTFE tape (Section 4.1.3.4.3)
11* Teflon Convoluted
Tubing
Mystik 7503 Tape 1 application 5/8” convolute (Section 4.1.3.2.6) then 3 Wraps 4
mil Mystic Tape: 50% Overlap (Section 4.1.3.2.4)
12 Teflon Convoluted
Tubing
Teflon Convoluted Tubing 1 application 5/8” convolute then 1 application 1” convolute 
(Section 4.1.3.4.6)
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Appendix 2
Does Civil Aircraft Wiring Exhibit Aging?
Walter Thomas III
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center
Greenbelt, Maryland
A previous Space Transportation System (STS) report [1] had reviewed FAA wiring incidents involving civil
aircraft to estimate wiring short circuit statistics. Wiring short circuit incidents were counted to derive an
occurrence statistic. This provides only a frequency of occurrence–the number of failures per some time
interval; no information on how or if failures vary over time (infant mortality, random, or wear-out) results.
To accomplish that, one needs to know when events occur (with respect to a relevant time scale) and
determine whether failures are decreasing, not changing or increasing with time. The Weibull distribution is
ideally suited for determining failure character as the plot slope will show the failure rate as decreasing,
increasing, or not changing, given a credible statistical fit.
Weibull analyses on civil aircraft wiring incidents were performed in a previous Shuttle wiring report [2].
Those data were updated for civil aircraft operated in air carrier service with records taken from the FAA
Aircraft Incident Database System (AIDS).* Search keywords were: “short,” “shorted,” “shorting,” “short 
circuit,” “wire,” and “wiring”. Data included incidents from 1978 to 2005. Connectors are a wiring
component, so connector events were included. Only air carrier/commercial and air taxi/commuter incidents
were used. Each incident was reviewed for relevance and consequence†; duplicate events were removed.
Table I summarizes the records reviewed and used by the author for Weibull analyses.
Table I. Summary of FAA AIDS Wiring Damage Occurrences
Keyword
Air carrier/
commercial
Air taxi/
commuter
Total
“hits”
# relevant &
non-con-
sequential
# avail. for
Weibull
analyses
Short 185 128 313 - -
Shorted 97 81 178 - -
Shorting 9 5 14 - -
Short circuit 5 3 8 - -
97 31
Wire 137 176 313 - -
Wiring 62 25 87 - -
153 61
Total 495 418 913 250 92
Al wiring failures (broken, chafed, loose, shorted and “other” failures; 250 relevant occurences, 92 usable 
for Weibull) are shown in Figure 1. These data fit a Weibull distribution well (Pve =41.6%‡). For all wiring
failures, air carrier aircraft show “early wear-out” failures as indicated by a Weibul slope () greater
than one.
* http://www.nasdac.faa.gov/
†Relevance means that the incident reflect a wire event; for example, “short” returned aircraft landing short of the runway incidents
and “wire” returned “struck a wire on take-of,” etc. A consequential event is a wire failure resulting from a cause other than wire
deterioration with age; for example shorts caused by fire, liquid contamination, overstress, or another component failing.
‡ “Pve” is P-value estimate indicating goodness of fit; a Pve greater than 10% indicates a good Weibull fit.
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Figure 1. Weibull Plot of ALL Wiring Failures on Air Carrier Aircraft
Weibul analyses typicaly are performed “one failure mode at a time”. That is, mixtures of failure modes can
confound the data. Although Figure 1 does exhibit a good statistical fit, there is some indication modes are
mixed: several lower points diverge from the main (center) distribution as do the last upper (longest time)
points. Thus data were analyzed further using separate failure modes.
Broken wires (94 failures) initially showed a good two-parameter fit (Pve = 12.5%) with early wear-out
failures () indicated. However, the first failure (at 1754 hours) strongly influenced the distribution.
This broken wire occurred in a B737-700 causing an engine fire. Its early occurrence suggested infant
mortality. Censoring this datum yielded a poor two-parameter fit (1.5%), but the curved shape suggested a
three-parameter Weibull distribution. A three-parameter fit was excellent (99.9%) withand=
39,800 hours indicating nearly random failures (~1), as shown in Figure 2. Time offset () was 4,433 hours,
that is, 4400 hours passed before the broken wire failures commenced.
Wire chafing failures (22, 14 usable for Weibull) showed an increasing failure rate indicative of early wear-
out failures:and= 27,400 hours (Pve 56%). Loose wires occurred as near-random failures
(and= 29,100 hours, Pve 58%).
The initial analysis for shorted wires (97, 31 Weibull usable) indicated early wear-out failures (=1.5,
= 42,000 hours, Pve = 52%). This plot showed several breaks with three or four subpopulations. These
distributions were separated and plotted, as shown in Figure 3. There are three, possibly four, failure
distributions with all showing greaters (3.4 to 4.5) pointing to wear-out or near wear-out failures. A contour
plot (Figure 4) compares three failure distributions within shorted wires:’s are equivalent (contours overlap 
along the vertical, beta, axis), but they are separated along the eta (time) axis.
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Figure 2. Weibull Plot for Air Carrier Broken Wire Failures
Figure 3. Shorted Wire Failures in Air Carrier Aircraft
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As this three distribution model is credible, aircraft wiring shorts likely manifest as wear-out failures
distributed over a range ofoperational times. These several “large ” distributions combine over a wide time
scale to produce an apparent lower-early wear-out distribution.
Figure 4. Comparing Weibull Parameters for Shorted Wires in Air
Carrier Aircraft (90% confidence intervals)
Helicopters and general aviation type aircraft are used in air carrier/commercial and air taxi/commuter
operations. The previous analysis [2] suggested possible differences in wiring failure rates between air carrier
(transport) and general aviation aircraft. Additional data in this study was used to test that hypothesis.
Weibull data are summarized in Table II.
Table II. Wiring Failure Data forComparing Aircraft “Classes”
Aircraft Class n  , hours Pve, %
Helicopters 8 2.4 7,900 86
General Aviation 25 1.6 8,700 63
Large/Transport 81 1.3 21,000 42
A contour plot (Figure 5) compares these wiring failures. Helicopters and general aviation aircraft wiring
failures haves equivalent to those for large/transport aircraft. However, helicopter and general aviation
aircraft failures occurred much sooner–note the distinct separation between etas (time axis). Thus general
aviation aircraft (and helicopter) wiring failures do occur earlier than those in large aircraft. No cause (why
general aviation failures occur earlier) can be determined from these data.
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Figure 5. Comparison of Wiring Failure Distributions Between Helicopters, General Aviation
and Large/Transport Aircraft used in Air Carrier/Air Taxi/Commuter Service
The above Weibull plots do not represent fleet in-service failure probabilities. To derive fleet failure
probabilities, cumulative “non-failed” (i.e., no wiring failures) operating hours for each aircraft type (those
incurring wiring failures) need to be summed. (That data was unavailable in the previous analysis [2]).
Adding non-failed operating times (“right censored” data) wil drive the Weibul plots down the probability 
scale and increase characteristic lifetimes (’s). Slopes should be relatively unafected [3].
An example illustrates including non-failed operating times. The SAAB SF-340 aircraft was considered.
Annual in-flight operating times were taken from the Transtat database§. Figure 6 is a Weibull plot with and
without non-failed operating times (suspensions). Adding non-failed data pushed the failure distribution
down the probability axis and slightly diminished its slope. This is expected since adding right suspensions
alters the failure ranks. Characteristic life also increased substantially. Another example using data for CE-
402 aircraft showed similar results: its bi-modal distribution increaseds (7720 to 15,000 hours and 17,400 to
21,400 hours) and decreaseds (2.2 to 2.1 and 11.5 to 9.3) when non-failed flight hours were added.
Figure 6. Accounting for Non-Failed Flight Hours, SF-340 Aircraft
§ http://transtats.bts.gov/
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Given reliable total annual flight hours for each aircraft type that exhibit wiring failures, complete fleet wiring
failure probabilities could be compiled. As that was not the intent of this or the prior work, the example
serves to demonstrate what needs to be done to compute true fleet probabilities.
To determine whether wiring is “aging”, one can examine failures over time (i.e., airframe hours at
occurrence) and analyze the data using a Weibull distribution. An increasing failure rate― that is, more
failures occurring as operating time increases― indicates “aging.” [An analogy is human mortality: people
are more likely to die (fail) as the get older (“age”).] Weibul slopes (s) greater than one show an increasing
failure rate; larger slopes (i.e., more than about four) indicate wear-out failures. From one to less than four
are “early” wear-out failures. Slopes less than one show infant mortality. For a detailed interpretation, see
Reference [3].
In summary, Weibull analyses have shown to be useful for evaluating wiring on aging aircraft. This work,
based on FAA aircraft incident records for air carrier, air taxi, commuter and commercial operations over
1978 through 2005 returned over 900 incidents of which 250 were relevant to wire aging. Approximately 90
records contained airframe hours (at occurrence). Subsequent Weibull analyses showed the following:
1. Shorted wires occurred most frequently (153 occurrences) followed by broken wires (120). Chafed
and loose wires occurred less frequently, 26 and 13 occurrences, respectively.
2. Air carrier aircraft showed early wear-out wiring failures (= 1.2) when all failures were combined.
3. Broken wire failures occurred approximately randomly over time (= 0.9); characteristic life () was
39,800 hours and the “failure-free” time was 4400 hours (three parameter Weibul distribution).
4. Wire chafing occurred as early wear-out failures, with= 1.25 and= 27,400 hours.
5. Loose wire failures were approximately random (= 0.93) with a characteristic life of 29,100 hours.
6. Shorted wires showed wear-out failures having three distributions occurring over 1000 to 60,000
hours with’s of 3.4 and 4.5. The distributions were distinct and separate.
7. Wire shorts and chafing both showed aging; shorts were wear-out and chafing early wear-out failures.
8. Wiring failures manifested significantly later for large transport aircraft compared to general aviation
aircraft and helicopters. General aviation and helicopter wiring failures were similar. Weibulls
were the same for all three aircraft classes.
9. Adding non-failed flight operating times to wiring failures decreases fleet failure probabilities (vs.
analyzing failures-only data). Slopes decreased slightly and characteristic lives increased
significantly.
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